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Anti-Social Behaviour, Expulsion from 
Condominium, and the Reconstruction 
of Ownership
DOUGLAS C. HARRIS*
Statutory condominium regimes facilitate massive increases in the density of owners. The 
courts are responding to this spatial reorganization of ownership by reconstructing what it 
means to be the owner of an interest in land. This article analyzes the ten cases over eight 
years (from 2008 to 2015) in which Canadian courts grant eviction and sale orders against 
owners within condominium for anti-social behaviour. The expulsion orders are new. Until 
these cases, ownership within condominium in Canadian common law jurisdictions was 
thought to be as robust as ownership outside condominium such that owners could not 
be expelled from condominium for anti-social behaviour. In addition to describing a new 
development in Canadian property law, the analysis reveals that some form of mental disorder 
appears to be a contributing factor in the majority of the cases. The article then argues 
that eviction and sale orders are not only reconstructing ownership, but also redistributing 
property. This is because the orders, although diminishing the security of property for 
some, enhance ownership for a great many more by providing a remedy—the physical and 
legal expulsion of an owner for chronic anti-social behaviour—that is not available to those 
outside condominium. Finally, the article argues that the judicial willingness to reconstruct 
ownership is a function, at least in part, of the spatial reorganization of owners. What it 
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means to be an owner of land emerged from a context where owners were dispersed over 
the surface of the earth. Under statutory condominium regimes, owners can now be stacked 
in a vertical column many stories high. The article concludes by asking whether the judicial 
reconstruction of ownership is an appropriate response to the spatial reorganization of 
owners and the resulting challenges posed by anti-social behaviour when the behaviour is 
frequently attributable, at least in part, to some form of mental disorder.
Le régime législatif de la copropriété facilite une augmentation massive de la densité des 
propriétaires. Les tribunaux réagissent à cette réorganisation spatiale de la propriété en 
reformulant la signification du fait de posséder un intérêt foncier. Cet article analyse, sur 
une période de huit ans (de 2008 à 2015), les dix cas où les tribunaux canadiens ont ordonné 
l’éviction de copropriétaires et la vente de leurs biens en raison de comportements antisociaux. 
Ces ordonnances d’éviction sont nouvelles car, jusque là, sous le régime de la common law 
du Canada, le statut de copropriétaire était réputé aussi robuste que celui de propriétaire, 
de sorte qu’un copropriétaire ne pouvait pas être expulsé en raison de comportements 
antisociaux. En plus de décrire une évolution du droit canadien en matière de propriété, cette 
analyse révèle qu’une certaine forme de désordre mental semble être un facteur contributif 
dans la majorité de ces cas. L’article fait de plus valoir que les ordonnances d’éviction et 
de vente ne font pas que reformuler le droit de propriété, mais redistribuent également la 
propriété. C’est parce que ces ordonnances, même si elles réduisent pour certains la sécurité 
du droit de propriété, améliorent le droit de propriété de beaucoup d’autres en apportant un 
recours—l’éviction physique et juridique d’un copropriétaire pour comportement antisocial 
chronique—qui n’est pas accessible en dehors de la copropriété. Finalement, l’article fait 
valoir que l’accord des tribunaux pour reformuler le droit de propriété est sous-tendu, du 
moins en partie, par la réorganisation spatiale des propriétaires. Le statut de propriétaire 
foncier date d’une époque où les propriétaires étaient dispersés à la surface de la terre. 
Sous le régime législatif de la copropriété, les propriétaires peuvent désormais s’empiler 
sur plusieurs étages de hauteur. L’article se termine en s’interrogeant sur l’adéquation de 
la reformulation judiciaire du droit de propriété en réponse à la réorganisation spatiale des 
propriétaires et aux problèmes qui en découlent, résultant de comportements antisociaux, 
lorsque ces comportements sont fréquemment attribuables, du moins en partie, à une 
certaine forme de désordre mental.
I. PERFECT STORMS
In 2010, a Toronto condominium corporation applied to Ontario’s Superior 
Court for an order to expel Natalia Korolekh. Her neighbours alleged that she 
was physically assaulting, verbally abusing and threatening them, damaging their 
property, peering into their homes, playing loud music at night, and using her 
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large and aggressive dog to frighten and intimidate. Accepting the evidence, 
including that of behaviour amounting to criminal acts of assault and mischief 
and a continuing refusal to adhere to condominium by-laws, Justice Michael 
Code ordered Ms. Korolekh to vacate and sell her townhouse. “This case,” he 
wrote, “is a ‘perfect storm’ where the misconduct is serious and persistent, where 
its impact on a small community has been exceptional and where the Respondent 
appears to be incorrigible or unmanageable.”1
A “perfect storm” describes a rare combination of circumstances that 
produces “the worst possible or an especially critical state of affairs.”2 By using 
this metaphor, Justice Code was indicating that eviction and sale orders against 
owners within condominium were a last resort, reserved for the most egregious 
and destructive behaviour, where no other order would suffice. In granting the 
order, he cited an earlier decision that denied a similar application, but which 
noted two unreported eviction and sale orders from the 1990s, and Justice Code 
indicated that he was aware of others.3 Nonetheless, the “draconian” and “extreme” 
order to expel an owner from condominium was without clear precedent and 
certainly not common.4 Several decades earlier, when Dennis Pavlich authored 
an early text on condominium law, ownership within condominium was thought 
to be as robust as that outside it, such that an owner could “never be evicted” 
for problematic behaviour.5 This has changed. In fact, Korolekh appears to have 
reflected and precipitated a change in climate such that perfect storms (or the 
judicial willingness to detect them) have become almost commonplace.
1. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp No 747 v Korolekh, 2010 ONSC 4448 at para 87, 
322 DLR (4th) 443 [Korolekh].
2. The Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed, sub verbo “perfect storm.”
3. York Condominium Corp No 136 v Roth, [2006] OJ No 3417 at para 20, 150 ACWS (3d) 
951 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Roth]. See also Korolekh, supra note 1 at paras 81-85.
4. Ibid at paras 8, 20. In 2003, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench made an eviction order, 
but not an order for sale. See Owners: Condominium Plan No 022 1347 v NY, 2003 
ABQB 790, 351 AR 76. See also the British Columbia Supreme Court’s eviction order in 
Strata Plan NW 1080 v Verlaan, cited in Paul G Mendes, “Bylaw Enforcement: Remedies 
from Fines to Injunctions and Evicting Owners” (27 April 2012), online: <lmlaw.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2013/12/REMEDIES-FROM-FINES-TO-INJUNCTIONS-AND-
EVICTING-OWNERS.pdf>.
5. Dennis Pavlich, Condominium Law in British Columbia (Vancouver: Butterworth, 1983) at 
2. Pavlich notes that:
A leasehold estate, even buttressed by the security of tenure provisions of the Residential 
Tenancy Act, does not, in the ordinary course of events, afford the same protection as an 
estate in fee simple. A condominium interest held in fee simple assures the owner that he can 
never be evicted.
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Since Korolekh in 2010, there have been five reported condominium eviction 
and sale orders from the Ontario Superior Courts,6 and two more from the 
British Columbia Supreme Court.7 A third decision from British Columbia 
involving a 99-year leasehold interest within a multi-unit structure (which uses 
lease agreements to emulate condominium ownership) cited the condominium 
case law in ordering that a leaseholder forfeit her interest.8 The same courts have 
declined to make eviction and sale orders in three other reported decisions since 
2010, ordering instead that the title holder comply with the condominium 
legislation and by-laws, but noting in each that an eviction and sale order 
remained in reserve should the behaviour continue.9
While Korolekh has become a touchstone for eviction and sale orders, there 
is an earlier reported case. In 2008, two years before Korolekh, the Ontario 
Superior Court ordered another condominium owner to vacate and sell her 
apartment. In Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 946 v 
JVM, Justice J Macdonald concluded that JVM, who suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia, created such “a health and safety risk” to the other owners that 
it was necessary to order her removal.10 All involved in the litigation accepted 
that the problematic behaviour—accumulation of garbage, pest infestations, 
overflowing toilets, damage to condominium property, and occasional violent 
outbursts—was a result of her illness. The decision to expel her turned on whether 
the condominium corporation had met its obligation, under the Ontario Human 
Rights Code, to accommodate her disability to the point of undue hardship.11 
Justice Macdonald, in ordering eviction and sale, confirmed that it had.12
6. Waterloo North Condominium v Webb, 2011 ONSC 2365, [2011] OJ No 2195 [Webb]; 
York Condominium Corp No 82 v Singh, 2013 ONSC 2066, 228 ACWS (3d) 572 [Singh]; 
Peel Condominium Corp No 304 v Hirsi, 2014 ONSC 346, 236 ACWS (3d) 1038 [Hirsi]; 
York Condominium Corp No 301 v James, 2014 ONSC 2638, 240 ACWS (3d) 223 [James]; 
Carleton Condominium Corp No 348 v Chevalier, 2014 ONSC 3859, 241 ACWS (3d) 
978 [Chevalier].
7. The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2013 BCCA 484, 52 BCLR (5th) 245 [Jordison 
(2013), BCCA]; Bea v The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138, 2015 BCCA 31, 94 CPC (6th) 
117 [Bea, BCCA].
8. Westsea Construction Ltd v Mathers, 2014 BCSC 143, 237 ACWS (3d) 215 [Westsea].
9. See York Condominium Corp No 137 v Hayes, 2012 ONSC 4590 at para 57, 20 RPR (5th) 
154 [Hayes]; Peel Condominium Corp No 98 v Pereira, 2013 ONSC 7340 at para 80, 235 
ACWS (3d) 832 [Pereira]; Strata Plan VR 390 v Harvey, 2013 BCSC 2293 at para 155, 236 
ACWS (3d) 1003 [Harvey].
10. Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 946 v JVM, [2008] OJ No 5412 at paras 
105, 108, 173, ACWS (3d) 1236 (Sup Ct) [JVM].
11. Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H 19, ss 2(1), 10, 11, 17.
12. JVM, supra note 10 at paras 87–98.
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The courts have used Korolekh as precedent for eviction and sale orders within 
condominium, but JVM, with its explicit consideration of mental disorder, has 
hardly been noticed.13 However, the presence of some form of mental disorder is 
not peculiar to JVM. The courts have noted mental illness or disability in five of 
the other nine cases in which they have granted eviction and sale orders.14 The 
references in these cases are fleeting, usually limited to passing mention, and 
sometimes only to an acknowledgement that the owner confronting eviction and 
forced sale had raised the issue. The courts have largely avoided the question of 
whether the presence of mental disorder should bear on the outcome, even as a 
pattern is emerging that it is a contributing factor in the majority of cases that 
lead to an order for eviction and sale.
This article has three Parts. First, I describe in Part II a new development 
in Canadian property law: court-ordered expulsions from condominium for 
anti-social behaviour. I begin with a brief survey of the approaches in other 
jurisdictions before turning to Ontario and British Columbia, the two most 
populous common law jurisdictions in Canada and those in which condominium 
ownership is most pronounced.15 The analysis proceeds chronologically, 
commencing with JVM, then Korolekh and the eight reported decisions that 
follow. In these cases, the courts expel condominium owners pursuant to 
discretionary powers granted in provincial condominium statutes intended to 
enable courts to enforce compliance with the legislation,16 or under the rules of 
civil procedure and the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to fashion appropriate 
sanctions for contempt of court.17 There is no mention of eviction and sale orders 
for anti-social behaviour in either the condominium statutes or the rules of civil 
procedure that govern contempt of court, and until these cases there was no 
precedent for such orders as part of the courts’ inherent jurisdiction in contempt 
of court proceedings. The orders, which Michael Kim describes as banishing 
13. James, supra note 6 at para 20, includes JVM in a list of relevant decisions. That list is 
acknowledged in Chevalier, supra note 6 at para 22.
14. Webb, supra note 6 at para 12; James, supra note 6 at para 22; Chevalier, supra note 6 at para 
24; Westsea, supra note 8 at paras 30, 35; The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2012 
BCSC 31 at para 11, 346 DLR (4th) 721 [Jordison (2012), BCSC].
15. On the proliferation of condominium ownership in British Columbia and Ontario, see 
Douglas C Harris, “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver” 
(2011) 36:3 L & Soc Inquiry 694; Gillad Rosen & Alan Walks, “Castles in Toronto’s Sky: 
Condo-ism as Urban Transformation” (2014) 37:3 J Urban Aff 289.
16. Condominium Act, 1998, SO 1998, c 19, s 134 [Condominium Act]; Strata Property Act, SBC 
1998, c 43, s 173 [Strata Property Act].
17. Singh, supra note 6; Bea, BCCA, supra note 7.
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or physically and legally expelling owners from condominium,18 are a new and 
significant development in Canadian property law.
Second, I argue in Part III that the eviction and sale orders are reconstructing 
ownership and redistributing property within condominium. By reconstruction 
I mean that the courts, in exposing owners to the possibility of eviction and sale 
orders for anti-social behaviour, are diverging from long-held and well-established 
conceptions of what it means to be an owner of an interest in land. Anti-social 
behaviour has never been a ground in common law jurisdictions on which 
neighbours could seek an order to evict an owner and force the sale of her 
property. The recent willingness of courts to use these orders is diminishing the 
security of property for some, but simultaneously enhancing the property of a 
great many more. This is because those within condominium who are grappling 
with a neighbour’s anti-social behaviour have access to a remedy—the expulsion 
of an owner—that is not available to those outside condominium. As a result, the 
eviction and sale orders act as a sanction against a few, but a remedy for many. 
They are not only reconstructing ownership but also redistributing property 
within condominium, for the enhanced ownership that some enjoy is won 
through the diminished security of property that others suffer.
Third, in Part IV, I conclude that the reconstruction of ownership is a 
function, at least in part, of the spatial reorganization of owners. In common 
law systems, the freehold or fee simple interest in land is generally understood 
to confer the status of “owner.” Those holding long-term leasehold interests, 
commonly of 99 years, have also been described as “leasehold owners,”19 but the 
freehold interest has been the unmodified marker of ownership. The meaning of 
ownership in land developed in a context where owners were dispersed over the 
surface of the earth in a single layer. Combining multiple freehold interests within 
a single building was possible at common law, but difficult and rare.20 Statutory 
condominium has changed this. Owners can now be stacked in a vertical column 
many stories high, and the courts are responding to the massive increase in the 
density of owners by changing what it means to be an owner. This article ends 
by asking whether the judicial reconstruction of ownership is an appropriate 
response to the spatial reorganization of owners and the resulting challenges 
18. Michael C Kim, “Involuntary Sale: Banishing an Owner from the Condominium 
Community” (1998) 31:2 John Marshall L Rev 429 at 431 (introduces the idea of physical 
and legal expulsion).
19. See e.g. Susan Bright, Landlord and Tenant Law in Context (Oxford: Hart, 2007) at 226; 
Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009) at para 4.1.10.
20. Harris, supra note 15 at 698–99.
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posed by anti-social behaviour when the behaviour is frequently attributable, 
at least in part, to some form of mental disorder.
Before proceeding, a note about how to characterize the behaviour that is 
leading to eviction and sale orders. The conduct that warrants expulsion usually 
involves inappropriate personal behaviour ranging from distasteful, disgusting, 
and disturbing, to violent acts and dangerous criminal activity. In a few cases, 
it is the inappropriate use of private units in violation of the condominium 
by-laws and, in some cases, criminal laws.21 The courts have also considered, 
but not granted, eviction and sale orders to address unauthorized renovation.22 
In studies of disorderly conduct in the housing context, most of it focusing on 
rental housing in the United Kingdom and Europe, scholars have adopted the 
term “anti-social behaviour” to capture activities that harass, alarm, or distress 
neighbours.23 However, the Ontario and British Columbia courts rarely use this 
term. Instead, they most commonly describe the behaviour as “misconduct,” as 
in Korolekh: “this case is a ‘perfect storm’ where the misconduct is serious and 
persistent.”24 The principal exception is JVM, where the court uses the more 
neutral “conduct” and characterizes the effects of the conduct, rather than the 
conduct itself, as unacceptable.25 The justices in the two other cases that engage 
most directly with the issue of mental disorder use the phrase “unacceptable and 
antisocial behaviour.”26 I use “anti-social behaviour” because it best captures the 
21. Singh, supra note 6 (involved using a residential unit to sell alcohol and cigarettes).
22. Harvey, supra note 9. For more information on the distinction between inappropriate use and 
inappropriate personal behaviour, see Cornelius Van Der Merwe, ed, European Condominium 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) at 230-313, 371-97 [Van Der Merwe, 
Condominium Law]. Case 4 (at 230) analyzes different approaches to inappropriate use, 
including unauthorized renovation, while Case 6 (at 371) considers inappropriate personal 
behaviour. For a study that employs finer grain distinctions between forms of anti-social 
behaviour, see M Vols, PG Tassenaar & JPAM Jacobs, “Anti-social Behaviour and European 
Protection against Eviction” (2015) 7:2 Int’l J L in the Built Env 148.
23. See Caroline Hunter, Judy Nixon & Michele Slatter, “Neighbours Behaving Badly: 
Anti-Social Behaviour, Property Rights and Exclusion in England and Australia” (2005) 
5 Macq LJ 149; John Flint, ed, Housing, Urban Governance and Anti-social Behaviour: 
Perspectives, Policy and Practice (Bristol: Policy Press, 2006); John Flint & Judy Nixon, 
“Governing Neighbours: Anti-social Behaviour Orders and New Forms of Regulating 
Conduct in the UK” (2006) 42:5-6 Urban Studies 939; Andrew Millie, Anti-Social Behaviour 
(Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009); Michel Vols, Marvin Kiehl & Julian Sidoli del 
Ceno, “Human Rights and Protection against Eviction in Anti-social Behaviour Cases in the 
Netherlands and Germany” (2015) 2 Eur J Comp L & Gov 156.
24. Korolekh, supra note 1 at para 87.
25. JVM, supra note 10 at para 20.
26. James, supra note 6 at para 21; Chevalier, supra note 6 at para 23.
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character of the conduct and its damaging effects without importing a judgment 
of wrongdoing that may not be appropriate where mental disorder is involved. 
Finally, I use “mental disorder” to encompass mental illness and mental incapacity 
caused by something other than illness, such as head trauma.
II. EXPULSION FROM CONDOMINIUM
Condominium property is primarily a creature of statute. Introduced across 
Canada in the 1960s, it exists under a number of different labels—“condominium” 
or “strata property” in the common law provinces, and “divided co-ownership” 
in the civil law jurisdiction of Quebec—but the form of ownership is similar.27 
Among the various legal structures that mark out property rights within 
multi-unit developments, the creation of individual titles for each unit is the 
principal distinguishing feature of condominium.28 Unit holders are title holders, 
and the titles are accompanied by a co-ownership interest (held with other title 
holders) in the common property, a right to participate in governing the private 
and common property (through the condominium corporation, strata council, 
or co-ownership syndicate), and an obligation to contribute to the maintenance 
of the common property. This is the package of rights and obligations that 
comprises ownership within condominium, but it is the presence of individual 
titles—and thus the status of owner—that provokes particular scrutiny when 
courts consider eviction and sale orders for anti-social behaviour.
The capacity to evict owners from condominium and to force the sale of their 
units for anti-social behaviour varies among jurisdictions, as a recent comparative 
study of European and South African condominium law reveals.29 Toward 
one of end of the spectrum, France does not permit eviction and forced sale, 
on the grounds that ownership is inviolable and the property rights of all within 
condominium are equal.30 Spain and Catalonia do not permit forced sale but 
allow a court to suspend rights of use for several years (three years in Spain, two 
27. For early analyses, see Alvin Rosenberg, Condominium in Canada (Toronto: Canada Law 
Book, 1969); RCB Risk, “Condominiums and Canada” (1968) 18:1 UTLJ 1.
28. See Peter Butt, Land Law, 6th ed (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2010) at 854-57; Harris, supra 
note 15 at 698-99.
29. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22. See also Cornelius Van der Merwe, 
“European Condominium Law: Nine Key Choices” in Amnon Lehavi, ed, Private 
Communities and Urban Governance: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Cham, 
Switzerland: Springer, 2016) 127 at 136-40.
30. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 385. Belgium (at 377) and Portugal (at 
392) also do not permit eviction and forced sale.
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in Catalonia).31 South Africa’s sectional title legislation does not address eviction 
and forced sale, but a judicial decision involving the use of a sectional title unit 
for drug dealing and prostitution suggests it may be appropriate to “deprive 
the owner and/or occupier of the right to reside in or use a unit” for chronic 
misconduct.32 The court does not mention forced sale, and it declined the make 
the eviction order, but nonetheless appeared to endorse the Spanish approach.33 
At the other end of the spectrum, a majority of civil law jurisdictions in Europe 
allow for eviction and forced sale in circumstances of inappropriate personal 
behaviour.34 A small subset permits eviction and sale orders for inappropriate 
use as well.35 The common law jurisdictions in Europe tend towards long-term 
leasehold arrangements rather than statute-based condominium to structure 
ownership in multi-unit developments, but there is no indication that the holder 
of commonhold title (the little-used version of condominium in England and 
Wales) would be subject to an eviction and sale order for anti-social behaviour.36
Condominium statutes in common law jurisdictions do not list eviction 
and sale orders as a possible response to an owner’s anti-social behaviour, and 
the courts have been hesitant to use them. In the Australian strata title regimes, 
Caroline Hunter et al noted in 2005 that “[i]ntransigent non-compliance [with 
strata by-laws] does not run the risk of forced sale and removal,” and this appears 
to remain the case.37 In his 1997 study of condominium legislation and case 
law in the United States, Kim found that “no condominium enabling statute 
31. Ibid at 249-50, 378-79 (Catalonia), 396-97 (Spain). See also Cornelius Van Der Merwe & 
Luis Muniz-Argüelles, “Enforcement of Conduct Rules in an Apartment or Condominium 
Ownership Scheme” in Sabin Arkan & Aynur Yongalik, eds, Festchrift liber amicorum Tuğrul 
Ansay (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006) 247 at 263-65.
32. Body Corporate of the Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v Estate of the Late Wilhelm Rippert 
and Others, (4542/02) [2002] ZAWCHC 15 at 11, [2003] 2 All SA 233 [Shaftesbury]. See 
also Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 394-96; GJ Pienaar, Sectional 
Titles and Other Fragmented Property Schemes (Cape Town: Juta & Co, 2010) at 210, 383. 
In addition, see the discussion in Part IV, below.
33. See Cornelius Van Der Merwe & Juann Booysen, “A critical evaluation of the sanctions 
available to remove chronic troublemakers from sectional title schemes” in Johan M 
Potgieter, Johann Knobel, & Rita-Marie Jansen, eds, Essays in Honour of Professor Johann 
Neethling (Durban: LexisNexis, 2015) 483.
34. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 376-77 (Austria), 379 (Croatia), 
381-82 (Denmark), 383 (Estonia), 385-86 (Germany), 389 (Netherlands), 390 (Norway), 
391 (Poland), 393-94 (Slovenia), 397-98 (Sweden).
35. Ibid at 256 (Croatia), 260 (Denmark).
36. Ibid at 382.
37. Hunter, Nixon & Slatter, supra note 23 at 154.
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expressly deals with the validity of an involuntary sale remedy provision.”38 
However, the absence of specific statutory authorization is not prohibition, and 
Kim noted that condominium by-laws commonly allow a condominium board 
to seek a court-ordered involuntary sale where an owner refuses to respect the 
rules. Notwithstanding the prevalence of these by-laws, he could not locate any 
appellate court orders directing an involuntary sale for failure to live by the rules 
of an association and he suggested that these provisions might be unenforceable.39 
Since that study, a 2011 decision in the Tennessee Court of Appeal to evict a 
“hoarder” and force the sale of her unit indicates that, at least in some states, the 
by-laws are enforceable.40
Across North America, Quebec is the only jurisdiction to specify in its 
divided co-ownership legislation that court-ordered sale may be an appropriate 
response to anti-social behaviour. The Quebec Civil Code provides that if the 
actions of a co-owner, in violation of the declaration of divided co-ownership 
(the constituting document and by-laws), cause “serious and irreparable injury” 
to the co-ownership syndicate or to other co-owners, then the injured parties 
may seek an injunction to compel the co-owner to comply. If the co-owner does 
not comply, then “the court may, in addition to other penalties … order the sale 
of the co-owner’s fraction.”41 In effect, the co-owner who violates the declaration 
and a court order to comply with the declaration may be expelled.
The condominium statutes in Ontario and British Columbia do not specify 
particular orders for anti-social behaviour, but instead provide the courts with 
broad discretion that they have used to grant eviction and sale orders. In Ontario, 
the orders arise from three sections in the province’s Condominium Act: section 
117 prohibits conduct that is “likely to damage the property or cause injury to an 
individual,” section 119(1) compels title holders and occupiers to comply with 
the Act and any by-laws established under the Act, and section 134 provides the 
courts with discretion to make “an order enforcing compliance” with the Act or 
38. For the United States, see Kim, supra note 18 at 436.
39. Ibid at 433. See also Michael R Fierro, “Condominium Association Remedies against 
a Recalcitrant Unit Owner” (1999) 73:1 St John’s L Rev 247 at 272. Fierro notes that 
“[e]victing a condominium unit owner may continue to be as difficult as expelling an 
annoying neighbour in the house next door.”
40. 4215 Harding Road Homeowners Association v Stacy Harris, 354 SW (3d) 296 (Tenn 
CA 2011) [Stacy Harris]. The American Psychiatric Association recently re-categorized 
“hoarding” as a distinct mental disorder, but the reasons for the decision only deal with the 
health and safety issues and not with what bearing the presence of a mental disorder should 
have on the appropriate court order. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed (Arlington: American Psychiatric, 2013).
41. Art 1080 CCQ.
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the by-laws or “other such relief as is fair and equitable in the circumstances.”42 
As a result, in applications against a title holder for eviction and sale orders, the 
courts must determine, first, whether the title holder has engaged in conduct that 
is prohibited under the Act or the condominium by-laws, and second, whether 
the prohibited conduct warrants eviction and forced sale.
The Ontario Superior Court’s first reported use of an eviction and sale 
order to enforce compliance with the Condominium Act is its 2008 decision in 
JVM.43 In 1992, JVM purchased an apartment in a multi-story condominium 
building in downtown Toronto. The other owners encountered problems almost 
immediately.44 These included the accumulation of garbage in her apartment 
and the hallway outside, foul odours and pests emanating from the apartment, 
and plugged and overflowing toilets causing water damage. When the building 
manager attempted to investigate, JVM refused to open her door and, within a 
few months of buying into the condominium, she was forcibly removed from the 
apartment by the police and hospitalized.
JVM suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The illness preceded her 
acquisition of the condominium apartment, and the behaviour that caused 
problems for the other residents escalated when she and her doctors were unable 
to manage the illness. In the ensuing years, police officers, firefighters, and 
paramedics were called to JVM’s apartment on numerous occasions, visits that 
sometimes led to her forcible removal from a filthy, garbage-filled apartment, and 
hospitalization. The apartment would be cleaned and JVM would return, but she 
would be unable to care for herself and the cycle of removal and hospitalization 
would continue. In 2004, the condominium corporation turned to the courts for 
an order to expel her. The court declined, instead making a “last chance” order 
that JVM comply with the condominium by-laws or face eviction and forced 
sale.45 In doing so, Justice E. Macdonald found:
42. Condominium Act, supra note 16, s 134(1) and (3). In the Condominium Act as amended by 
the Protecting Condominium Owners Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 28, Schedule 1, s 118, Ontario 
added section 135.1 to indicate in 135.1(1) that the courts could order “a person to vacate 
a property permanently” if (a) they posed “a serious risk (i) to the health and safety of an 
individual, or (ii) of damage to the property or the assets, if any, of the corporation,” or  
(b) if non-compliance with a court order demonstrated that “(i) the person is unsuited for 
the communal occupation of the property or communal use of the property, and (ii) no other 
order will be adequate to enforce compliance.” The amendment, which does not address 
forced sale, is not yet in force.
43. JVM, supra note 10.
44. See the summary of the agreed statement of facts. Ibid at para 63.
45. Ibid at paras 14-16.
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL64
The Corporation has demonstrated that it has displayed great sympathy to the 
unique circumstances of the Respondent who is seriously disabled. The matter has 
a ten year history. It is this court’s duty to balance her interests with those of the 
adjoining owners and the Corporation itself.
It is undisputed that the Corporation has done everything in its power to resolve the 
situation. The history of the matter suggests that there is a distinct probability that 
the cycles of the past w[ill] repeat in the future.46
After this intervention, JVM controlled her illness for a time, but by 2007, her 
condition had deteriorated and she began cycling through periods of involuntary 
hospitalization. When she was in the apartment, her behaviour created health and 
safety risks for the other residents. In 2008, the province appointed the Office 
of the Public Guardian and Trustee to manage her affairs and the condominium 
corporation returned to court for an eviction and sale order. This time, Justice J. 
Macdonald ordered the eviction and sale.47 In doing so, he declined to accept the 
argument of the Public Guardian that to evict JVM was to discriminate against 
her on the basis of disability in violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code.48 
The condominium corporation had a duty to accommodate JVM’s disability, 
but he concluded that it had done so to the point of undue hardship as required 
under the Code.49
JVM was a case involving self-inflicted harm that caused serious health and 
safety risks to the other residents in the condominium property. Most of the 
other eviction and sale orders stem from an owner’s aggressive and threatening 
behaviour towards other residents. This includes Korolekh, the most widely cited 
eviction and forced sale precedent.50
In Korolekh, the owners in the thirty-unit, two-level townhouse development 
in downtown Toronto sought to remove Natalia Korolekh on the grounds of 
“serious and wide-ranging” misconduct.51 Ms. Korolekh denied the allegations—
set out in lengthy affidavit evidence from other title holders, the property manager, 
and a neighbouring resident who was not part of the condominium property—
but did not otherwise address or engage the specific complaints about her 
behaviour.52 Justice Code concluded that she had damaged property and injured 
other owners, in breach of section 117, and that an eviction and forced sale order 
46. Ibid at para 12.
47. Ibid at para 109.
48. Ibid at para 5.
49. Ibid at para 88.
50. Korolekh, supra note 1.
51. Ibid at para 2.
52. Ibid at paras 6-46.
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was “justified in the unusual circumstances.”53 Those circumstances were, first, 
that the community was small, with prominent communal space, and that the 
defendant’s conduct had “effectively destroyed” the utility of that space.54 Second, 
the misconduct was extreme—including physical violence, damage to property, 
“extraordinary verbal abuse,” and frightening residents with a large dog—and 
was carried out in a “devious, persistent and vindictive manner.”55 Third, the 
defendant had not complied with orders from the condominium corporation 
or heeded its warnings, nor had the current court proceedings caused her to 
modify her behaviour. Finally, given the breadth of the defendant’s misconduct, 
a compliance order would involve the court in supervising her behaviour and 
the courts “ought not to become involved in any long term attempt to oversee, 
manage and reform the broad array of extreme behaviour” exhibited in this case. 
These factors comprised a “perfect storm” and justified an eviction and forced sale 
order.56 Justice Code continued:
In all these circumstances, it would be unwise to try to reintegrate Ms. Korolekh into 
a community that fears her and that she has persistently tried to intimidate. People 
join condominium corporations voluntarily on the basis that they agree to share 
certain collective property and to abide by a set of rules and obligations that protect 
that collectivity. There is no right to continue membership in this corporation or 
this community, once a clear intention to harm it and a persistent refusal to abide 
by its rules have been exhibited in the extreme ways seen in this case. Ms. Korolekh 
has irreparably broken the bond with her community and an effective order cannot 
be made that would force these parties to now join together again.57
In highlighting the “community” aspects of condominium, Justice Code 
downplayed the individual titles that feature prominently in condominium 
ownership. In fact, the capacity to hold individual titles within a multi-unit 
property is one of the defining and attractive features of condominium. More 
commonly than not, the owners within condominium endure rather than 
embrace the “community” in order to hold separate titles. However, in this case it 
appears that the group of owners had forged some collective identity around the 
sharing of communal space, which the actions of Ms. Korolekh had destroyed.
The decision in Korolekh was followed within a year by another reported 
eviction and sale order in Waterloo North Condominium v Webb.58 Urbane 
53. Ibid at para 86.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid at para 87.
57. Ibid at para 88.
58. Webb, supra note 6.
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Lorenzo Webb had been convicted of and served jail time for criminal offences 
against other owners within the condominium. He represented himself in the 
proceedings and did not contest the allegations of misconduct, but instead alleged 
financial and procedural impropriety by the condominium corporation. In a brief 
decision, Justice M.D. Parayeski concluded that even accepting Mr. Webb’s 
allegations, they “would not justify or in any way rationalize his behaviour.”59 In 
the penultimate paragraph Justice Parayeski acknowledged several other factors 
that might explain Mr. Webb’s conduct:
The respondent says, and I accept as true, that he has suffered a brain injury and 
that he had a difficult childhood. Neither of these facts, however unfortunate and 
deserving of sympathy as they may be, can justify his conduct.60
The self-represented Mr. Webb does not appear to have introduced other 
evidence to corroborate the brain injury or its impact on his behaviour, but it 
is not clear that additional evidence would have changed the outcome. Justice 
Parayeski acknowledged the “drastic” character of an eviction and forced sale 
order, but “[g]iven the history of the respondent’s behaviour and that even the 
serving of jail time has not proven effective in curbing his conduct,” determined 
that such an order was necessary to deliver the “basic security and the quiet 
enjoyment” to which the other owners were entitled.61 In listing these attributes 
of ownership within condominium, Justice Parayeski slipped into the realm of 
leasehold interests where the right to “quiet enjoyment” is at the core of every 
tenancy, and where eviction for the conduct exhibited in this case would be 
unexceptional, at least for the relatively short term leases to which the residential 
tenancy legislation applies and that do not secure the status of leasehold owner. 
“Quiet enjoyment” is not a term that is commonly associated with freehold 
interests; its use in this case was an early, and perhaps unintentional signal of a 
willingness to rethink ownership within condominium.
In 2012, the British Columbia Supreme Court turned to Korolekh and 
Webb when it granted what appears to be the province’s first reported eviction 
and sale order in response to anti-social behaviour within strata property. 
In The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, the court concluded that Rose 
Jordison, who owned an apartment in a 137-unit strata property development, 
and her adult son, Jordy Jordison, who lived with her, had abused and harassed 
other title holders with foul language, obscene gestures, intimidating behaviour, 
59. Ibid at para 5.
60. Ibid at para 12.
61. Ibid at paras 9-10.
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and unacceptably loud noise.62 The behaviour had continued for four years, and 
neither warnings from the strata council nor $20,000 in fines had prompted the 
Jordisons to temper their behaviour. In desperation, the other owners sought an 
eviction and sale order to expel the Jordisons from the condominium. Justice 
Blair concluded the province’s strata property legislation provided the court with 
the authority to make such an order and that it was a proportionate response in 
the circumstances. In doing so, he noted that although the Jordisons’ conduct 
was not “as extreme” as that in Korolekh, it still justified the “draconian” eviction 
and forced sale order so that “harmony may be reinstated within the Strata.”63 
He also noted that Ms. Jordison had alleged discrimination against her son on 
the grounds of disability in another proceeding:
Ms. Jordison filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) 
that the Strata’s actions against her were discriminatory because the activities about 
which the Strata complained were the result of her son’s physical and intellectual 
disabilities caused by the autism with which she asserted her son suffered. …The 
Jordisons did not file the medical evidence and withdrew their complaint from the 
Tribunal.64
The allegation is not mentioned again in the decision or in the three Jordison 
decisions that would follow.
The Jordisons had not appeared at trial, but on appeal they succeeded in 
overturning the order. The British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled that unlike 
the Ontario legislation, which provides courts with broad discretionary power 
to make eviction and sale orders on the initial application from aggrieved 
owners, British Columbia’s Strata Property Act requires a breach of a prior order 
before a court may expel an owner from condominium.65 Sections 173(a) and 
(b) permit the courts to order an owner to perform a required duty under the 
Act, or to stop contravening the Act, and section 173(c) enables the courts to 
make “any other orders it considers necessary to give effect to an order under 
paragraph (a) or (b).”66 Given the explicit reference to the earlier paragraphs, the 
Court of Appeal ruled that paragraph (c) was “designed to enhance the efficacy 
of the two preceding subsections,” and therefore that the broad discretionary 
authority it conveys could only be exercised in support of a prior order to 
62. Jordison (2012), BCSC, supra note 14.
63. Ibid at paras 81-82.
64. Ibid at para 11.
65. The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2012 BCCA 303, 35 BCLR (5th) 36 
[Jordison (2012), BCCA].
66. Condominium Act, supra note 16.
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perform a required duty or stop contravening the Act.67 It upheld the trial court’s 
order that the Jordisons stop making loud noises, obscene gestures, and abusive 
and intimidating comments directed at other title holders, and more generally 
that they comply with the Strata Property Act and strata property by-laws, but 
overturned the eviction and sale order.68
In 2013, the owners in strata plan LMS 2768 were back in court, alleging 
that the Jordisons’ misconduct had continued unabated and arguing that an 
order for eviction and sale was now warranted because the Jordisons were in 
contempt of the prior order.69 The trial court agreed, and this time so did the 
Court of Appeal:
The competing private property interest … must, in my opinion, yield to the rights 
and duties of the collective as embodied in the bylaws and enforceable by court 
order. The old adage “a man’s home is his castle” is subordinated by the exigencies of 
modern living in a condominium setting.70
Moreover, the Jordisons “have repudiated the cooperative foundation of strata 
living and their intolerable behaviour has brought about the forced sale.”71 
In making this order, the Court of Appeal established an approach that emulated 
the rule in Quebec’s Civil Code: Orders for eviction and forced sale were available, 
but only where the owner was in contempt of a prior court order.72
Following the decisions in Korolekh, Webb, and Jordison, the courts in 
Ontario seemed to pause in their willingness to use eviction and sale orders against 
owners for inappropriate personal behaviour. In York Condominium Corp No 
137 v Hayes, the Ontario Superior Court accepted the evidence of other owners 
that Edna Merle Hayes “committed no less than five physical assaults on other 
condominium unit owners or occupiers and, in several other instances, engaged 
in verbal abuse, threats and intimidation in relation to a board member, other 
unit owners or occupiers and service providers to the condominium.”73 However, 
although she “repeatedly intimidated and instilled fear in a number of her fellow 
members of this community,” the behaviour did not warrant expulsion.74 That 
order was “the ultimate and harshest remedy available,” and “should be reserved 
67. Jordison (2012), BCCA, supra note 65 at para 14.
68. Ibid at para 18.
69. The Owners Strata Plan LMS 2768 v Jordison, 2013 BCSC 487, 227 ACWS (3d) 267 
[Jordison (2013), BCSC].
70. Jordison (2013), BCCA, supra note 7 at para 25.
71. Ibid at para 27.
72. CCQ, supra note 41.
73. Hayes, supra note 9 at para 26.
74. Ibid.
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for the most egregious cases.”75 Similarly, in Peel Condominium Corp v Pereira, the 
Superior Court found that Rui Pereira, over a period of 10 years, had “behaved in 
an inappropriate and abusive manner … including the repeated use of threatening 
and offensive language,”76 but that “while the actions of Mr. Pereira are extremely 
serious and troubling,” they did not warrant an eviction and sale order.77 In both 
cases, the Superior Court granted compliance orders, but noted that eviction and 
sale orders remained in reserve should the inappropriate conduct continue.78
If Hayes and Pereira signalled a drift away from court ordered evictions and 
sales in circumstances of inappropriate personal behaviour, a trio of Ontario 
cases and one decision from British Columbia in 2014 reversed the trend. In its 
brief decision in Peel Condominium Corp No 304 v Hirsi, the Ontario Superior 
Court granted an order to sell Ms. Lull Hirsi’s unit following a finding that the 
“incorrigible and unmanageable” defendant had engaged in “outrageous and 
persistent conduct,” including “incidents of stabbing and shooting and other 
intolerable conduct,” which had an “exceptional impact on a building occupied 
by law abiding senior citizens.”79 This was the “perfect storm” that justified an 
order to sell.80
Several months later, the Ontario Superior Court considered another 
application for an eviction and sale order in York Condominium Corp No 301 v 
James.81 Valerie Victoria James was subject to an earlier court order not to enter 
the common areas (except as needed to access her unit), not to have any contact 
with other owners or employees of the condominium, not to come within 25 
feet of any individuals who had sworn affidavits in the proceedings, not to come 
within 25 feet of the management office, and not to disturb “the comfort and 
quiet enjoyment” of other owners and their visitors.82 The order was an attempt 
to address what was described in the affidavits as violent, abusive, harassing, 
threatening, aggressive, intimidating, and inappropriate behaviour.83 Within 
a month, Ms. James had breached the order repeatedly, and the court ordered 
75. Ibid at para 55.
76. Pereira, supra note 9 at para 68.
77. Ibid at para 79.
78. Ibid at para 80; Hayes, supra note 9 at para 57.
79. Hirsi, supra note 6 at para 2.
80. Ibid.
81. James, supra note 6.
82. Ibid at para 6. As in Webb, the terminology of leasehold—“quiet enjoyment”—had slipped 
into the court’s characterization of freehold interests. See Webb, supra note 6 at para 7.
83. James, supra note 6 at para 5.
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that she undergo a mental health examination.84 When she breached that order 
as well, the court appointed the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee as 
litigation guardian, and a few days later she was arrested under provisions in the 
Mental Health Act.85
When the matter appeared before Justice B.P. O’Marra as an application 
for an eviction and sale order, the litigation guardian informed the court that 
since her release from hospital one month earlier, Ms. James had been on her 
medication and that there had been no further incidents. Even so, Justice O’Marra 
expressed concern that “[p]revious court orders were not sufficient to control 
the unacceptable and antisocial behaviour” and that her behaviour “presented 
a series of health and safety issues for other residents, management and visitors 
to the condominium corporation.”86 In granting the order, he addressed her 
mental disorder:
Unfortunately, the respondent suffers from a mental illness. I appreciate that it will 
be a hardship for her to vacate the unit and have the unit sold. However, it must be 
borne in mind that while the applicant is a corporate body, it is the men, women 
and children who live and work in the building and their visitors and guests who 
have been confronted with behaviour that ranges from disturbing to disgusting to 
threatening. I do not see remedies short of an order vacating the unit and ordering a 
sale as sufficient to address the uncontested breaches of the Act and the rules of the 
condominium corporation.87
Several weeks after this decision, the Ontario Superior Court released another 
decision in which mental disorder appears to have been a factor. In Carleton 
Condominium Corp No 348 v Chevalier, the owner (Yves Chevalier) and his 
tenant (George Basmadji) were subject to court orders directing them to stop 
damaging and making unauthorized alterations to common property, to stop 
engaging in conduct that risked the safety of other residents, and to refrain from 
engaging in verbally abusive and threatening behaviour.88 When neither police 
visits nor the court order caused the conduct to cease, the court issued a second 
order to evict the tenant, Mr. Basmadji.89 He refused to leave, and when the 
police attempted to remove him, he produced a transfer instrument and claimed 
that Mr. Chevalier had transferred the apartment to him. Mr. Basmadji was using 
the status of owner to forestall eviction, and it did cause delay. The third court 
84. Ibid at para 8.
85. Ibid at paras 9-11.
86. Ibid at para 21.
87. Ibid at para 22.
88. Chevalier, supra note 6 at para 17.
89. Ibid at para 18.
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order voided the purported transfer and authorized the police to remove the 
tenant from the unit.90 In making a fourth and final order, this time to evict 
Mr. Chevalier and force the sale of the unit, Justice R Beaudoin indicated, 
“it is obvious that previous court orders have been insufficient to control the 
unacceptable and antisocial behaviour of the Respondents.”91 He also noted that 
Mr. Chevalier “suffers from a mental illness.”92 The court (at the request of the 
condominium corporation) had asked the Office of the Public Guardian and 
Trustee to appoint a property guardian and then litigation guardian during the 
first proceedings when it appeared that Mr. Chevalier “was in danger of losing 
his house due to non-payment of a relatively small amount of condominium 
fees.”93 He would eventually lose title to his condominium unit because of 
“unacceptable and antisocial behaviour” that appears to have been due, at least in 
part, to mental illness.94
In the midst of the trio of Ontario decisions in 2014, the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in Westsea Construction Ltd v Mathers made a forfeiture order 
against a leaseholder who was in breach of the lease.95 The residential complex 
in Richmond, a suburb of Vancouver, used leasehold interests to emulate a 
condominium, and Terrise Mathers, who held a 99-year lease expiring in 2083, 
was in default for unpaid operating expenses and an assessment for major repairs. 
She was also in breach of multiple provisions of the lease because of the conduct 
of her brother, Jeffery Mathers, who occupied the unit. This included dumping 
unsightly and hazardous junk in the common areas near the unit, theft of 
common property, leaving unlicensed and unregistered vehicles in the car park, 
keeping animals, and inviting visitors whom he “knew or ought to have known, 
would lead to dangerous conditions for the residents of Sussex Square, namely 
a shooting and hostage-taking incident involving police.”96 The self-represented 
Ms. Mathers acknowledged that her brother was a hoarder,97 and the court 
explained her evidence as follows:
Ms. Mathers says she bought the suite for her brother with the understanding 
between them that he would try and stabilize his life. Mr. Mathers suffers from 
mental illness for which he takes medication. She has provided a note from his 
90. Ibid at para 20.
91. Ibid at para 23.
92. Ibid at para 24.
93. Ibid at para 13.
94. Ibid at para 23.
95. Westsea, supra note 8.
96. Ibid at para 19.
97. Ibid at para 20.
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family physician that details the effect of that illness on Mr. Mathers’ emotional 
health, ability to concentrate and complete his activities of daily living. Ms. Mathers 
has looked after Jeffrey for most of his life and they are very close. She says “if we 
lose the suite I don’t know what will happen to Jeff.”98
Justice Gropper acknowledged the mental disorder and the efforts of Ms. Mathers 
to help her brother, but held that they did not excuse the breaches of the lease 
agreement or override the rights of the other residents to the quiet enjoyment 
of their units:
I appreciate that Ms. Mathers is doing what she can for her brother who suffers from 
a mental illness. However, her brother’s conduct has caused Ms. Mathers to breach 
the terms of the agreements that she has with the petitioners. It also interferes with 
the quiet enjoyment that the other leaseholders are entitled to in accordance with 
their contracts with the petitioners.99
In ordering that Ms. Mathers forfeit her interest for breach of the lease, and in 
refusing to grant relief from forfeiture, Justice Gropper drew on the Court of 
Appeal decision in Jordison. “[O]ne only need replace the word ‘condominium’ 
with the wor[d] ‘leasehold,’”100 she wrote in comparing the earlier case with the 
one before her and concluding:
Ms. Mathers, by allowing Mr. Mathers to reside in her suite and by failing to take 
steps to address his conduct, has undermined the cooperative foundation of this 
leasehold setting. As in Jordison, there is “ample evidence… that only a sale would 
resolve the problem.”101
She also indicated that the forfeiture order was appropriate because the payments 
in arrears were as much or more than the unit’s value.102 If there had been value to 
Ms. Mathers in the unit, then it appears Justice Gropper would have entertained 
relief from forfeiture, but would have followed Jordison in making an eviction 
and sale order instead.
In addition to these cases involving inappropriate personal behaviour, the 
Ontario Superior Court made an eviction and sale order in 2013 where the 
owners were making inappropriate use of their condominium unit. When York 
98. Ibid at para 30.
99. Ibid at para 35.
100. Ibid at para 37.
101. Ibid at para 39. Caroline Hunter and Judy Nixon note the frequent termination of leases in 
women-headed households in the United Kingdom for the anti-social behaviour of sons or 
boyfriends. See Caroline Hunter & Judy Nixon, “Taking the Blame and Losing the Home: 
Women and Anti-social Behaviour” (2001) 23:4 J Soc Welfare & Fam L 395.
102. Westsea, supra note 8 at para 42.
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Condominium Corp No 82 v Singh came before the court, Nutan Singh, Narayan 
Sundar Singh, and Namita Singh were subject to a prior court order, made under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, prohibiting them from “conducting the business of 
selling alcohol and cigarettes” in their unit.103 When the activity continued, the 
condominium corporation sought a ruling that they were in contempt of court 
and an order for their eviction and the sale of their unit. The action proceeded in 
contempt under the Rules of Civil Procedure and under the discretionary powers 
granted in the Condominium Act to enforce compliance.104 The court found 
the Singhs in contempt of the court order and in breach of the condominium 
by-laws, and ordered that they vacate and sell their unit.105
A third category of conduct that might lead to an eviction and sale order—
unauthorized renovation—came before the British Columbia Supreme Court in 
Strata Plan VR 390 v Harvey.106 This case involved Wendy Joan Harvey’s repeated 
and unauthorized renovation of common property within the strata complex in 
violation of by-laws and multiple court orders (one of which levied $70,000 in 
special costs) that she and her common-law partner, Douglas Michael Edgar, 
refrain from renovating the common property and from impeding access to the 
common property. The court indicated, “a strong remedy is necessary,” but did 
not order Ms. Harvey to vacate and sell her unit.107 In declining to grant the 
“severe and extreme remedy,” the court noted that the problematic renovation 
work was substantially complete and thus, the “opportunity for friction between 
[strata council and owner] is now significantly diminished.”108 The resulting order 
included detailed provisions to prevent Ms. Harvey and Mr. Edgar from interfering 
with the strata council’s work on the common property, including stipulations 
that they not be present in the building while the work was being done.109
The latest reported decision involving an eviction and forced sale order for 
anti-social behaviour—Bea v The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138—stems from a 
103. Singh, supra note 6 at para 3.
104. Condominium Act, supra note 16, s 134; Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194,  
r 60.11(5)(f ).
105. Singh, supra note 6 at para 59. The ruling is somewhat ambiguous, but the court appears to 
have made the eviction and forced sale order primarily on the grounds that the Singhs were 
in contempt of court. As a result, the order falls within the court’s broad discretion under the 
Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the Condominium Act. See Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 
1990, Reg 194, r 60.11(5).
106. Harvey, supra note 9.
107. Ibid at para 146.
108. Ibid at paras 152, 154.
109. Ibid at para 161.
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dispute over parking.110 In 2006, the owners in the 35-unit strata development 
voted to assign parking spaces within the complex to individual units rather than 
continue the practice of unrestricted access among them. Huei-Chi Yang Bea, 
one of the owners, objected, and she and her husband, Cheng-Fu Bea, filed a 
petition with the courts to overturn the decision. The petition was dismissed, 
but the Beas persevered, and, as the British Columbia Supreme Court relates, 
launched “multiple proceedings in this Court and in the Court of Appeal over 
the last six years that have occupied countless court hours, frustrated dozens of 
judges, severely tested the patience of the registry staff, and put the strata owners 
represented by the respondent to a great deal of expense they can ill afford.”111 
The courts made numerous orders, including orders that the Beas not file any 
document in relation to the parking dispute. These were ignored, and the courts 
fined the Beas for contempt of court. Even so, the petitions and appeals continued 
unabated, leading the other owners to approach the courts for an eviction and 
sale order against Mrs. Bea.
It was an unusual petition. Although Mrs. Bea owned an apartment in the 
condominium, and she and her husband were using that ownership status to 
launch multiple proceedings against the strata council, their actions did not 
appear to violate the Strata Property Act or the strata by-laws, so the court’s 
remedial power under section 173 of the Strata Property Act to make any order 
necessary to enforce compliance with a prior order did not apply.112 Instead, 
the petition rested on the inherent jurisdiction of the court to craft appropriate 
sanctions for contempt of court and on the owners’ argument that the Supreme 
Court Civil Rules, which only provided for fines or incarceration as sanctions 
for contempt, did not preclude the court from using its inherent jurisdiction to 
order the sale of property.113 Nonetheless, Justice Grauer turned to the rulings in 
Jordison for guidance and came to a similar conclusion: Eviction and sale was the 
only viable and meaningful order.
Normally, a person’s property rights would be irrelevant to the question of an 
appropriate sanction for contempt of court. This case is not normal. Here, the 
property interest in question is precisely what fuels the Beas’ contemptuous acts 
and gives rise to the injustice that results. I conclude that a forced sale is the only 
appropriate and meaningful sanction for Mrs. Bea’s contempt of court. In the 
unique circumstances of this case, it is a proportional response to the manner in 
110. Bea, BCCA, supra note 7.
111. Bea v The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2138, 2014 BCSC 826 at para 1, 241 ACWS (3d) 333.
112. Ibid at para 64.
113. Ibid at paras 44-47.
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which Mrs. Bea has used her ownership interest to frustrate and abuse the court’s 
process, and afflict her fellow owners.114
A majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed: seizure and sale 
of property fell within the court’s inherent jurisdiction, and the eviction and sale 
order was appropriate given the conduct and the circumstances in this case.115 
The Court of Appeal’s departure from “normal” sanctions for contempt of court 
indicates that the majority understood it was contemplating something new. 
Indeed, the courts are using the discretionary provisions in the condominium 
legislation and their jurisdiction in contempt of court to reconstruct ownership 
within condominium.
III. RECONSTRUCTING OWNERSHIP AND REDISTRIBUTING 
PROPERTY
From 2008 to 2015, the courts in Ontario and British Columbia have made 
nine reported eviction and sale orders within condominium and one forfeiture 
order in a leasehold development to address what they most commonly describe 
as misconduct. Described as “draconian,” “extreme,”116 and to be reserved for 
the “perfect storm” of chronic, egregious, and destructive misconduct within 
condominium,117 the expulsion orders have nonetheless become one of the 
available responses to anti-social behaviour. In making the orders, the courts 
appear to understand them as a necessary diminution of ownership within 
condominium. This sentiment is captured in the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal’s use of the well-worn castle metaphor in Jordison:
The competing private property interest … must, in my opinion, yield to the rights 
and duties of the collective as embodied in the bylaws and enforceable by court 
order. The old adage “a man’s home is his castle” is subordinated by the exigencies of 
modern living in a condominium setting.118
In short, individual interests within condominium must defer to the collective 
such that ownership within condominium is less robust than it is outside.
114. Ibid at para 66.
115. Bea, BCCA, supra note 7 at paras 76, 89. See Justice Goepel (in dissent), at paras 136-42, 
noting that the Supreme Court Civil Rules constrained the inherent jurisdiction of the court 
in sanctioning contempt.
116. Roth, supra note 3 at paras 8, 20.
117. Korolekh, supra note 1 at para 87.
118. Jordison (2013), BCCA, supra note 7 at para 25.
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This change in what it means to be an owner may be described, in the terms 
articulated by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, as a shift from the 
stronger property rule protection for an entitlement to the weaker liability rule 
protection.119 A property rule secures an entitlement by stipulating that it can 
only be transferred from its owner with consent, in a voluntary transaction and 
for a value accepted by the owner. Conversely, a liability rule provides that an 
owner has a right to the objectively determined value of an entitlement, were it 
to be taken, but has no right to the entitlement itself. Under a liability rule, the 
holder of an entitlement might lose that interest involuntarily, perhaps through 
expropriation, but would have a right to compensation. Before the court decisions 
reviewed in this article, anti-social behaviour was not a basis for stripping owners 
of their property; owners, including those within condominium, were protected 
by a property rule that required their consent to the transfer of their property. 
Now, however, in circumstances of chronic and extreme anti-social behaviour 
within condominium, the courts will diminish the protection for owners such 
that they are entitled to the value of their interest—determined objectively 
in a court-ordered sale of the interest—but not the interest itself. By making 
condominium property vulnerable to confiscation because of anti-social 
behaviour, the courts have shifted from property rule to liability rule protection 
for owners within condominium.
Another way to describe the change is that the courts have made it a condition 
of continuing ownership within condominium that owners maintain a minimum 
standard of personal behaviour. This “conditionality” for continuing ownership is 
new—retaining ownership has not been subject to meeting minimum standards 
of behaviour—although scholars have noted the growing propensity to attach 
conditions in order to receive, and to continue to receive, government-distributed 
benefits, including welfare and housing.120 In the context of social housing, where 
residents usually occupy their units as tenants, attaching conditions that require 
certain minimum levels of conduct to be or remain eligible for housing becomes 
one means of controlling behaviour. Conditions such as these have not attached 
to owners, but now they do, at least within condominium.
The difficulty of fitting the eviction and sale orders into Tony Honoré’s 
classic list of the standard incidents of ownership reveals the magnitude of 
119. Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85:6 Harv L Rev 1089.
120. Flint & Nixon, supra note 23 at 951.
HARRIS,  RECONSTRUCTION OF OWNERSHIP 77
the change that the courts are making to ownership.121 The list of incidents is 
comprised primarily of rights—to possess, to use, to manage, to the income, 
to the capital, et cetera—but also includes “liability to execution” and a “duty 
to prevent harm.”122 Honoré restricted the liability, and thus potential loss of 
ownership, to non-payment of debt or insolvency; he did not contemplate 
liability for anti-social behaviour. It is possible that the court orders for eviction 
and sale because of anti-social behaviour might be shoehorned into the “duty 
to prevent harm,” but the fit is not obvious. Honoré described this as a duty 
to refrain from using, and to prevent others from using, the thing owned in a 
manner that might harm others. He took his automobile as an example; it was 
something he could use freely, but not in a manner that harmed others. Similarly, 
he could build on his land, but not such that the building would collapse on a 
neighbouring property. One might characterize the owners who were expelled 
from condominium for anti-social behaviour as contravening the prohibition on 
harmful use, but the expulsions were not so much for the harmful use of property 
as for the effects of personal conduct on others. Fitting these orders within 
Honoré’s incidents of ownership requires a broader interpretation of either the 
liability or the duty than as Honoré described them. In short, the eviction and 
sale orders are reconstructing ownership within condominium in a manner that 
is far from trivial.
However, while the general tenor of the judgments suggests that the courts 
understand eviction and sale orders as diminishing the nature of ownership 
within condominium, the language used to describe the orders reveals something 
else. In almost all the cases, the courts label the order as a “remedy” rather than a 
“sanction.” In fact, except for the decisions in Bea, which involved the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts to craft sanctions for contempt of court, the courts 
hardly use the term “sanction.” It appears in the text of the other decisions 
only twice: once in the first trial court decision in Jordison,123 and then in the 
second decision by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the same litigation, 
where the court uses it simply to indicate that it is deciding the case under the 
condominium legislation, not as a sanction for contempt of court.124 Conversely, 
121. AM Honoré, “Ownership” in AG Guest, ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1961) 107.
122. Ibid at 123-34.
123. Jordison (2012), BCSC, supra note 14 at para 71.
124. Jordison (2013), BCCA, supra note 7 at para 3.
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nearly all the courts use the term “remedy” (or variations of it) when considering 
an order for eviction and forced sale.125
This use of the term “remedy” to describe the eviction and sale orders is 
understandable, particularly in British Columbia where the section conferring 
the discretionary power to make them appears under the heading “Other court 
remedies.”126 It is also meaningful. “Sanction” in this context suggests a penalty 
that serves primarily to diminish ownership within condominium; “remedy” 
connotes a beneficial intent, with the purpose of preserving or enhancing 
ownership. By labelling the eviction and sale orders as remedies, the courts 
are revealing the benefit these orders confer on owners who are dealing with 
the anti-social behaviour of a neighbour. In fact, the availability of the order 
enhances ownership within condominium in a manner not available to those 
who hold property outside it. Owners outside condominium can encourage 
the state to invoke criminal punishment where a neighbour’s activity involves 
assault or mischief. They may also have recourse to causes of action in tort 
such as nuisance. However, the cases considered in this article reveal that these 
responses are sometimes inadequate to stop anti-social behaviour. Indeed, it is the 
ineffectiveness of all other measures that leads the courts to make the eviction and 
sale orders.127 The decision in Webb, where the Ontario Superior Court noted 
“even the serving of jail time has not proven effective in curbing his conduct,” is 
a striking example.128
The courts in Ontario and British Columbia are providing owners within 
condominium a remedy that is not available to those outside condominium: the 
physical and legal expulsion of an owner for chronic and egregious anti-social 
behaviour. In doing so, they are reconstructing ownership within condominium. 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the principal effect of this reconstruction is to enhance 
ownership within condominium, not diminish it. From the perspective of the 
owner subject to an eviction and forced sale proceeding, her property interest is 
more tenuous than if she held that same interest outside condominium. However, 
for all other owners within condominium—including the 29 who sought to 
rid themselves of Ms. Korolekh and the 136 who suffered the Jordisons—the 
capacity to expel an owner physically and legally with court ordered eviction 
and sale enhances their ownership. This is why the courts speak of the eviction 
125. But see Webb, supra note 6; Roth, supra note 3 (the exceptions).
126. Strata Property Act, supra note 16, s 173.
127. For a discussion regarding escalating sanctions, see Van Der Merwe & 
Muniz-Argüelles, supra note 31.
128. Webb, supra note 6 at para 9.
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and sale orders as remedy rather than sanction. Of course, the direct impact of 
these orders depends on an owner’s position. Those who are subject to the orders 
suffer a newly established susceptibility and diminished security of their property, 
but the vast majority enjoy a remedy that enables them to expel an exceedingly 
difficult and, in some cases, dangerous neighbour. As a result, eviction and forced 
sale orders have a redistributive effect, enhancing the ownership of most within 
condominium, but at the expense of the property of others.
If this reconstruction of ownership is also its redistribution, does this 
redistribution follow identifiable patterns? Any conclusions will be tentative 
because of the small number of cases, but one clear pattern is emerging: The 
courts in Ontario and British Columbia are reconstructing ownership within 
condominium primarily as a response to the destructive effects of owners who 
suffer some form of mental disorder.
IV. THE SPATIAL REORGANIZATION OF OWNERSHIP
Condominium provides an architecture of ownership that facilitates an increase 
in the density of title-holding “owners.” Where there was once a single owner 
holding a defined portion of the surface of the earth with a property interest 
extending (in common law jurisdictions) upwards to the heavens and downwards 
to the centre of the earth—cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos—
after condominium there can be several hundred owners living cheek by jowl 
and stacked in a vertical column. In this spatial reorganization of ownership, 
property boundaries harden and become ascertainable volumes, defined in three 
dimensions by floors, walls, and ceilings of units within buildings, rather than by 
the expansiveness and vagueness of Latin maxims.129 Condominium accomplishes 
the increased density of owners by combining individual titles to defined units, 
undivided shares of common property held in common by each title holder, and 
a right to participate in the governance of the private and common property. 
In most circumstances, this packaging of rights—coupled with an obligation 
to contribute to the maintenance of commonly held property—overcomes the 
challenges of multiple owners, each with a spatially defined private interest within 
a single building. Indeed, some have argued that the combination of private and 
common property within various hybrid or mixed models of ownership, such 
129. See Harris, supra note 15 at 699-701.
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as condominium, provide better solutions to governance challenges than either 
private or common property alone.130
The density of individual titles that condominium facilitates is new, but the 
human density that it helps to produce is not. Residents of multi-unit buildings, 
living in close proximity and sharing physical structures and spaces, have most 
commonly occupied their private spaces as tenants under a lease, not as title 
holders. Within landlord and tenant law, tenants may forfeit their leasehold 
interests for cause, including anti-social behaviour. At some point, a tenant’s 
disruptive conduct will justify eviction.131 In fact, a landlord may even have an 
obligation to evict a disorderly tenant to protect the “quiet enjoyment” of other 
tenants. Conversely, a title holder’s right to remain in possession, and to remain 
as owner, has not been so fragile. Anti-social behaviour affecting neighbours 
has not provided grounds to remove an owner. This immunity for owners has 
been, in part, a function of their relative dispersal, which makes the damaging 
consequences of anti-social behaviour less acute. Owners have seldom been 
stacked on top of each other and have never co-existed in such density before. This 
density creates challenges for neighbours, which Michele Slatter, in her study of 
hoarding and housing risk, describes as one of the disadvantages of proximity.132 
The courts are responding to the challenges of density, or the disadvantages of 
proximity, by changing what it means to be an owner within condominium.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts are turning to that body of property 
law more accustomed to managing a density of individual property interests—
landlord and tenant law—as they reconsider ownership within condominium. 
The use of “quiet enjoyment,” one of the essential attributes of a leasehold interest, 
to describe the rights of owners within condominium, is a revealing marker of the 
legal repertoire that the courts are drawing from as they confront the challenges 
created by the heightened density of owners. The sanction within landlord and 
tenant law for chronic anti-social behaviour in breach of a lease agreement or of 
applicable residential tenancies legislation is forfeiture of the leasehold interest. 
Forfeiture orders provide the legal mechanism to expel a tenant for anti-social 
behaviour, and it is this capacity to expel that the courts have adopted in the 
context of freehold interests within condominium. Instead of forfeiture, the 
130. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A Heller, “The Liberal Commons” (2001) 110 Yale LJ 549; 
Amnon Lehavi, “Mixing Property” (2008) 38 Seton Hall L Rev 137.
131. See Residential Tenancies Act, SO 2006, c 17, ss 61-66; Residential Tenancy Act, SBC 
2002, c 78, s 47.
132. See Michele Slatter, “Treasures, Trash and Tenure: Hoarding and Housing Risk” (2008) 2:1 
People, Place & Pol’y 28 at 33.
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courts order eviction from, and sale of, the freehold interest. The trend appears to 
be, as Slatter suggests, to “infuse ‘ownership’ … with aspects of rental.”133
The transfer of inspiration is not unidirectional. Tenants holding long-term 
leasehold interests, commonly of 99 years in the case of residential tenancies, 
are generally understood as leasehold owners.134 As with those holding freehold 
interests, leasehold owners appear to have been immune to expulsion from their 
leasehold units for anti-social behaviour. However, this also seems to be changing 
such that owners, whether occupying their units within multi-unit dwellings as 
freeholders or long-term leaseholders, may be expelled from their residences for 
anti-social behaviour.135 The challenges of density are similar, regardless of the 
form of tenure, and the courts are finding different ways to the same outcome: 
expulsion of the disorderly owner-occupier. Moreover, long-term leasehold is 
also possible within condominium—individual units and common property are 
held as leasehold rather than freehold interests—although these arrangements 
are much less common than freehold, and there are no reported cases in 
Ontario or British Columbia involving anti-social behaviour within a leasehold 
condominium. Given the emerging willingness of courts to expel freeholders 
from condominium for anti-social behaviour, it seems clear that they will also 
remove leaseholders for similar conduct. In doing so, the courts are likely to 
grant relief from forfeiture and turn to the eviction and sale orders that they 
have deployed against freeholders. The leasehold owners would be expelled, but 
would be entitled to the value of their interests (following forced sale) rather than 
forfeiting them.
This modification of ownership in response to its changing spatial context 
should not be surprising. As a social institution that plays a prominent role in 
defining relations between people with respect to things, the law of property must 
adapt to its context, even as it helps to shape that context. Lee Ann Fennell has 
recently called for the reinvention of the fee simple absolute, recommending that 
its geographical fixity and perpetual existence be rethought in order to recreate 
the property interest in a manner that would facilitate optimal urban land use.136 
Legal historian Stuart Banner, in studies of the ownership of airspace and the idea 
of ownership in the 19th and 20th century United States, emphasizes the impact 
133. Ibid at 34.
134. See Bright, supra note 19; Gray & Gray, supra note 19.
135. Westsea, supra note 8.
136. See Lee Ann Fennell, “Fee Simple Obsolete” 91 NYU L Rev [forthcoming in 2016].
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL82
of technological change on prevailing regimes of property law.137 The invention 
of the airplane, for example, prompted a re-evaluation and eventual departure 
from the rule, as characterized by Blackstone, that “Land hath also, in its legal 
signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards.”138 The courts 
would reshape what it means to own land by limiting the interests of a landowner 
to “the airspace directly above the ground” in order to facilitate flight.139 This 
modification of the boundaries of ownership was not a necessary outcome, argues 
Banner, but only one among a number of possibilities that might enable airplanes 
to move through air spaces that had once been divided, under the Latin maxim, 
into many private lots protected by actions in trespass.140
Statutory condominium is another innovation that, by enabling a massive 
increase in the density of owners, is causing courts to re-evaluate and reconstruct 
ownership.141 However, the judicial response has not been to reshape the 
physical boundaries of ownership, as in the case of airplanes and airspace, but to 
reconstruct ownership in a defined space. For some—those subject to eviction 
and sale orders—their property has become less secure in that they may now be 
expelled for anti-social behaviour.
The capacity of common-interest communities or developments, including 
condominium, to act as technologies of exclusion has drawn considerable 
critical attention.142 Some have argued that common-interest developments 
construct an architecture of ownership that facilitates the sequestration of those 
with property to create enclaves of privilege, memorably labelled “privatopia” 
by Evan McKenzie,143 and “Fortress America” by Edward Blakely and Mary 
Snyder.144 Others have described common-interest communities as a form 
137. See Stuart Banner, Who Owns the Sky? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) 
[Banner, Sky]; Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and What We Own 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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139. Ibid at 288.
140. Ibid at 293.
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Douglas C Harris & Nicole Gilewicz, “Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, and the 
Nature of Property” in B Hoops et al, eds, Rethinking Expropriation Law II: Context, Criteria, 
and Consequences of Expropriation (The Hague: Eleven, 2015) 263.
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of “civic secession,”145 a “new enclavism,”146 or the “fortress city,”147 detaching 
those with means from a sense of responsibility for a larger municipal or public 
realm and enabling “government for the nice.”148 Critics have shown that the 
proliferation of common-interest developments has exacerbated socio-economic 
divisions and racial demarcations.149 However, the scholarship focuses largely on 
the common-interest developments of American suburbs, the typically sprawling 
character of which has made them targets of critique for reasons other than their 
capacity to exclude.150 There has been much less critical attention devoted to 
condominium, which has become the ownership structure of choice for multi-unit 
dwelling in urban settings.151 However, the use of eviction and sale orders suggest 
that the capacity of condominium owners to exclude—to function, in the case of 
condominium towers, as vertical gated communities—should be viewed with a 
more critical eye. Moreover, it is not just the capacity to exclude those who might 
become owners, but also the capacity to expel those who are already owners that 
is at issue. The early evidence suggests that the courts are using eviction and sale 
orders most commonly to enable private communities of owners to expel those 
with a mental disorder that makes it difficult to live in close proximity to others.
Where the courts acknowledge the possibility of mental disorder when 
considering an expulsion order, the discussion is usually brief, not amounting to 
more than passing mention. In several decisions, the judges express sympathy, and 
in James the court makes the eviction and sale order almost apologetically (albeit 
with little analysis).152 The lack of engagement with the impact of mental disorders 
is partly a function of the limited evidence presented to the courts. Many of the 
owners attempting to stave off eviction and sale orders are self-represented, and 
145. Sheryll D Cashin, “Privatized Communities and the ‘Secession of the Successful’: Democracy 
and Fairness beyond the Gate” (2000) 28:5 Fordham Urb LJ 1675 at 1677-78.
146. Rowland Atkinson & Sarah Blandy, “Introduction: International Perspectives on The New 
Enclavism and the Rise of Gated Communities” (2005) 20:2 Housing Studies 177.
147. Setha M Low, “Urban Fear: Building the Fortress City” (1997) 9:1 City & Society 53.
148. Paula A Franzese, “Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and 
the Rise of Government for ‘the Nice’” (2005) 37:3 Urb Law 335. See also Setha Low, 
Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America (New York: 
Routledge, 2003).
149. Blakley & Snyder, supra note 144 at 148-49.
150. Comparative volumes include Rowland Atkinson & Sarah Blandy, eds, Gated Communities 
(London: Routledge, 2006); George Glasze, Chris Webster & Klaus Frantz, eds, Private 
Cities: Global and Local Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2006).
151. But see Leslie Kern, Sex and the Revitalized City: Gender, Condominium Development, and 
Urban Citizenship (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010); David Ley, The New Middle Class and the 
Remaking of the Central City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
152. James, supra note 6 at para 22.
(2016) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL84
the judges often have little more to work with than a respondent’s assertion that 
mental illness or disability is a contributing factor in the anti-social behaviour.
However, with the exception of JVM, it is also clear that the judges do not 
think that evidence of mental disorder or incapacity bears on the nature of their 
orders. They are inclined to accept, but not probe, the evidence of illness or 
disability, and to grant the order anyway. In fact, the evidence of mental disorder 
may almost explain, if not warrant, the order. A report on the law in Sweden 
suggests the “draconian sanction [of eviction and sale] seems justified because 
scenarios encountered in this Case [obnoxious behaviour] are usually caused 
by some sort of mental disturbance on the part of the offender.”153 The courts 
in Ontario and British Columbia have not said that mental disorder justifies 
their rulings, but nor do they interrogate the fact that their orders, which are 
reconstructing ownership within condominium, are in many cases a response to 
behaviour that may well be attributable to mental disorder.
Are eviction and sale orders for anti-social behaviour an appropriate 
reconstruction of ownership in light of the enormous increase in density of 
owners that condominium facilitates? It may be that there are social circumstances 
that justify enhancing collective forms of private governance and, in the case of 
an owner’s anti-social behaviour, strengthening the capacity of a community of 
title holders to sustain that community by expelling a chronically disruptive and 
socially destructive owner.154 The South African High Court suggested as much 
when, in declining to evict an owner for drug dealing and prostitution, it indicated 
“there is a pressing ‘social need’ in South Africa” to provide title holders the 
means to enforce the rules in sectional title properties, and that sometimes this 
might include the capacity to exclude for “constant and deliberate contravention 
of the conduct rules.”155 The analysis in the ruling is brief. The court appears to 
take judicial notice of the “pressing ‘social need,’” and there is no explanation of 
its nature or character. Cornelius Van Der Merwe and Juann Booysen suggest 
several justifications, including one based on the observation that the impetus for 
introducing sectional title (condominium) in South Africa “was the provision of 
real property rights to a greater segment of the population, thereby fulfilling the 
psychological need for a home.”156 They appear to suggest that in the social and 
153. Van Der Merwe, Condominium Law, supra note 22 at 398.
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political context of post-Apartheid South Africa, it may be particularly important 
for owners within sectional title properties to feel safe and secure, and that the 
capacity to exclude the chronically disruptive title holder might help. Perhaps, 
but the history of South African property law in the twentieth century suggests 
the need for great caution when constructing forms of property that enable 
groups of owners to exclude, and Van Der Merwe and Booysen conclude that 
a time-limited suspension of the right to use, rather than permanent expulsion, 
is the appropriate and proportionate response to chronic misconduct.157
There is little doubt that the anti-social behaviour, which led to eviction 
and sale orders in the cases surveyed here, substantially reduced the quality of 
life for many if not all of the other owners within the condominium properties 
involved. In some of the cases, the behaviour was so extreme as to threaten the 
safety of the other residents. In every case where the order has been granted, 
the behaviour was exceedingly disruptive and upsetting. My point in raising 
the apparent prevalence of mental disorder in circumstances where courts are 
making eviction and sale orders is neither to justify the anti-social behaviour 
nor minimize its impact. Instead, my intent is to call attention to the fact that 
these orders are reconstructing ownership within condominium and, by doing 
so, redistributing property. This redistribution enhances the ownership for some 
while diminishing the security of property for others, and those whose interests 
are diminished appear, more often than not, to suffer a form of mental disorder 
that contributes to their problematic behaviour. The eviction and sale orders, 
which are not available to owners dealing with chronic anti-social behaviour 
outside condominium, are providing owners within condominium the capacity to 
expel other owners and, in doing so, are transforming long-held, well-established 
understandings of ownership. To raise concern about this is not to conclude that 
owners within condominium bear responsibility for those among them who are 
mentally ill or have a mental disability. However, it is to ask whether, in adapting 
the law of property to the spatial reorganization of ownership, the courts should 
be reconstructing ownership within condominium in a manner that facilitates 
the expulsion of the mentally ill.
157. Ibid at 495.

